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Strict Liability of Cigarette

Manufacturers and Assumption of Risk
A. A. White*
THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC TREATMENT

The liability of manufacturers for the physical harms allegedly caused by the smoking of cigarettes has been before the
courts on several occasions' and has been dealt with by a goodly
number of writers. 2 In the main, the courts have sought solutions by using the concepts of negligence, express and implied
warranty, strict liability, and assumption of risk as worked out
for and applied to other types of industries.3 While some of the
legal writers have focused specifically on the unique characteristics of the issues in the cigarette cases, 4 others have examined
the issues somewhat more superficially. These traditional modes
of treatment by the courts and this latter group of writers have
obscured the basic question: whether under all the facts and
circumstances cigarette manufacturers should bear the loss
which the use of their products has caused.
Such conceptualized treatment has also caused remote and
false analogies. Judge Goodrich, concurring in Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,5 was troubled about holding liable
the manufacturer of cigarettes, a product unavoidably danger* Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F. 2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), prior appeals
reported in 325 F. 2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963) and 304 F. 2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) ;
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F. 2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), prior appeal reported in 295 F. 2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328
F. 2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F. 2d 19
(5th Cir. 1963).
2. See, e.g., James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550 (1966) ; Prosser, Strict
Liability to the Consumer in California,18 HAST. L. REV. 9 (1966) ; Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,
807-14 (1966) ; Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 678 (1966) ; Comment, The Deadly Weed: Cigarettes are in Trouble, 5
HOUSTON L. REV. 717 (1968); Comment, Cigarette Manufacturers' Warranty;
Application of Old Law or New, 11 VILL. L. REV. 546 (1966).
3. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F. 2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968) (implied
warranty) ; Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F. 2d 479 (3d Cir.
1965) (negligence, express and implied warranty) ; Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.,
328 F. 2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (confused implied warranty and strict liability);
Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (negligence
and implied warranty).
4. See James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections
on EnterpriseLiability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550 (1966) ; Wegman, Cigarettes and
Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678 (1966) ; Comment, The Deadly
Weed: Cigarettes are in Trouble, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 717 (1968).
5. 295 F. 2d 292, 302 (3d Cir. 1961).
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ous, on a theory of implied warranty of merchantability lest it
compel a similar holding against the makers of whiskey, butter,
and salted peanuts. The court in Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 6 shared this concern and enlarged the list to include the manufacturers of sugar and ice cream. Prosser, discussing strict liability sounding in tort, has been more expansive
still by adding the makers of sharp knives, hammers, legal
drugs, rabies vaccine, automobiles, ether, castor oil, and the
givers of blood for transfusions. 7 Prosser recognizes that in
actions based on negligence we have been able to escape the
difficulty he foresees in applying strict liability because "The
utility and social value of the thing sold clearly outweighs the
known, and all the more so the unknown risk," resulting in
there being no negligence in marketing such products in their
expected normal state. s It would seem, however, that the same
process of balancing of values and harms should be available to
us in applying strict liability." No reason compels us to slavishly
apply strict liability to the manufacturers of all such products
because we elect to apply it to some. The common characteristic of having potential for harm does not create an indestructible unity of those products regardless of other differences.
Courts, in some instances with the aid of juries, have been making value judgments similar to those involved in distinguishing
among such products throughout the history of tort law. In
negligence cases, the initial escape from Winterbottom v.
Wright ° was accomplished by making a distinction between
products," and the transition from negligence as a ground of
recovery by consumers against manufacturers to the grounds
of implied warranty and strict liability was made by making
similar distinctions.' 2 For courts to decline to extend strict liability sounding in tort to the manufacturers of cigarettes solely
because they fear an "infinity of actions" or a "flood of litigation" involving other products would be to again give us a body
of law by judicial fear-historically the source of much bad
6. 317 F. 2d 19, 37 (5th Cir. 1963).
7. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 807-14 (1966) ; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in
California,18 HAST. L. REV. 9, 23-27 (1966).
8. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAST. L. REV.
9, 23-27 (1966).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
10. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
11. See the history related in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

12. See Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942).
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law.13 It is inconceivable that courts, having extended strict
liability to cigarettes manufacturers, would be unable to distinguish between them and the manufacturers of hammers and
castor oil. The Federal Communications Commission was met
with a similar problem when it invoked the fairness doctrine
as to cigarette advertising. The cigarette manufacturers urged
that the commission was setting a precedent which it could extend to other products. The commission replied that it knew of
no other "advertised product whose normal use has been found
by the Congress and the government
to represent a serious
4
potential hazard to public health."'

The application of the doctrine to distillers, one of the groups
for whom tender concern has been expressed, might not be amiss
for reasons similar to those discussed hereinafter with respect
to cigarette manufacturers. The fact that we tried and repealed
prohibition is no argument against doing so" since the political
judgment to repeal prohibition in no sense constituted a judgment that a legal whiskey industry should not pay its way.' 6
Return is now made to the specific, basic question of whether
there should be a general judicial policy of strict liability against
cigarette manufacturers for the physical harms caused by smoking cigarettes. Strict liability has been recently extended by
many courts to a great mass of industrial products potentially
harmful if sold with an unexpected defect, or if caused to be
used without adequate warning or instructions. 17 Such basis of
liability is confidently asserted to be the law of today and tomorrow.' 8 Whether the doctrine will be extended to cigarette
manufacturers involves the broader question of whether it is
to be extended to the manufacturers of any product which is
unavoidably dangerous. If it is to be extended to any, cigarette
13. See White, The Reasonably Just Man, 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 575, 588-98
(1968).
14. Gimlin, Regulation of the Cigarette Industry, 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP.
867 (1967).
15. James, The Untold Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on
Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1552-53 (1966).
16. Cf. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910),
where the shipowner was held liable to the dock owner for damages caused' to the
dock during a furious storm, although the shipowner was lawfully docked and all
steps he took to remain docked and to preserve his ship were lawful. The shipowner was simply required to pay his way.
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) ; Santo v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) ; Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
18. Wade, Recent Developments in the Law of Strict Liability for Products, 33
INS. COUNSEL J. 552, 553 (1966).
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manufacturers and whiskey distillers are among the most likely
to be included because of the unique facts surrounding their
product's use. There is no reason why the manufacturers of
such products should be exempt from the sort of critical examination which produces judicial policy distinctions. The difference between rabies vaccine and cigarettes, two unavoidably
dangerous products, is as great and as clear as that between
cigarettes and permanent wave lotions, which is not treated as
unavoidably dangerous.19 The approach should be that of weighing and balancing all social evils and values, the unavoidably
dangerous status of any product being only one of the multitude
of relevant factors to be considered.
One of the functions of this paper will be to examine the
social evils and values of the manufacture and consumption of
cigarettes to determine whether strict liability should be extended to cigarette manufacturers.
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
In 1966, 700,000 families in the United States cultivated
976,000 acres to produce a tobacco crop valued at $1,254,000,000,
or $1,266 per acre. 20 The five states of North Carolina, Kentucky,
Virginia, South Carolina and Tennessee provided approximately
five-sixths of this production.2 1 Exports of the value of $611,000,000 were made during that year, offset by imports valued
at $137,000,000, leaving a favorable trade balance of $474,000,000.22 The 976,000 acres devoted to tobacco and its $1,254,000,000, or $1,266 per acre crop, compares to: 36,644,000 acres
devoted to soybeans, producing a crop valued at $2,583,000,000,
or $73 per acre; 1,436,000 acres devoted to peanuts, producing
a crop valued at $271,000,000, or $190 per acre; 1,479,000 acres
devoted to irish potatoes, producing a crop valued at $663,000,000, or $448 per acre; and 56,888,000 acres devoted to corn,
23
producing a crop valued at $5,285,000,000, or $92 per acre.
Tobacco is thus revealed to be a very high gross-yield-per-acre
crop. The net yield, however, presents a substantially modified
picture. It required 494 man-hours of labor to produce an acre
19. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
20. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1967, 635 (88th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Stat Abs. 1967] ;
Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678, 725

(1966).
21. Information Please Almanac 719 (Golenpaul ed. 1968).
22. Id. at 725.
23. Stat. Abs. 1967, 634-36.
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of tobacco, whereas corn, cotton, and potatoes could be pro-4
duced with 6.4, 44 and 47.6 manhours of labor respectively.2
This suggests that the net value of the tobacco produced per
acre is not significantly different from the net value per acre
of other crops. This is substantiated by comparing recent average values of farm lands in the principal tobacco-producing
states with those in states producing little, if any, tobacco.
Such average values for Kentucky and North Carolina, the two
principal tobacco-growing states, were $165 and $158 per acre,
respectively, while such averages for Mississippi, Texas, and
Oklahoma, states producing insignificant amounts of tobacco,
were $182, $172 and $181, respectively. 25 There is no indication
that the acreage devoted to tobacco production could not produce meat and many of the world's other needed food crops.
In fact the principal tobacco-producing states of Kentucky,
North Carolina, and Virginia produce a diversity of such food
26
products.
In 1966, the government made price support loans to tobacco
growers in the amount of $64,984,384, and during the years
1933-1967, there was a subsidy in the form of a realized loss
on such loans of $44,615,601.27 The subsidized growth and export of foods would be a much more effective, and much more
humanitarian instrument of international policy, than the subsidized growth and export of tobacco. Any other course means
that some must starve in order that others may smoke.
So if by a combination of governmental policies including
taxation, education, regulation of advertising, and the imposition of strict tort liability, the tobacco industry was gradually
phased out of American life, or substantially so, no great and
enduring economic void would necessarily result in our agricultural economy. Any void created could be filled by the production of life-sustaining agricultural products.
In 1965, 75,124 persons were employed in the manufacture
of tobacco products, producing an annual payroll of $353,000,000. In 1966, tobacco manufacturers realized net profits after
taxes of $389,000,000 amounting to 5.9% of sales. This compared to like profits in the food industry of $2,102,000,000,
amounting to 2.7 % of sales. The tobacco industry was 9th out
of 26 major industries in the ranking of profits to sales. The
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 629.
Id. at 616.
World Almanac 332, 340, 346 (Long ed. 1968).
Id. at 606.
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annual profit rate in 1966 on stockholders's equity was 14% as
compared to that for textile mill products of 10 %; to that of
leather and leather goods products of 12.9 % ; to that of petroleum and petroleum products of 12.4 % and to that of all manufacturing corporations of 13.4 0.21
The production of cigarettes in 1966 amounted to 562,677,000,000, resulting in a per capita consumption of 4,290. This
was up from a production of 147,922,000,000 in 1940, and a per
capita consumption of 1976. In order to induce the populace
to use its products, the tobacco industry in 1964 spent $328,000,000 for all forms of advertising. This was 6.1 % of its total
receipts and constituted the highest such percentage of all industries. The 6.1% compares to 4.4% for chemicals and allied
products, the next highest; and 0.91% for apparel and other
fabricated textile products.29 The average family expenditure
for tobacco in 1960-61, was 1.8% of family income though in
the case of the rural, nonfarm population and of Negroes, the
poorer elements of our society, the percentages were 2% and
2.2 % respectively. The actual expenditure for tobacco in 1962
was $7,400,000,000 and in 1965, $8,400,000,000.10 From the
manufacture and sale of cigarettes in 1966, the federal government collected $2,006,000,000 in taxes and the states collected
from the sale of tobacco products $1,541,000,000.3'
In addition to the foregoing economic and tax values of the
tobacco industry, there are claimed physical and psychological
benefits from the use of tobacco. The physical benefits claimed
are "(a) maintenance of good intestinal tone and bowel habits
• . . . and (b) an anti-obesity effect upon reduced hunger and
a possible elevation in blood sugar. 3 2- While recognizing that
to the extent the claims were valid, they could not be "totally
dismissed," the Committee reporting to the Surgeon General
concluded: "[I] t would be difficult to support the position that
these attributes would carry much weight in counter-balancing
a significant health hazard. 3 3 The committee found more nebulous and troublesome the question of the relationship of smoking to mental health. It noted that historically man had sought
contentment through the use of pharmacologic aid and that
28. Id. at 582-83.
29. Stat. Abs. 1967, 807-09.

30. Id. at 338, 323.
31. Id. at 396, 429.
32. Public Health Serv., U. S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Smoking
and Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service 355 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Smoking and Health '64].
33. Id.
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cigarettes contributed to the satisfaction of this widespread
need for a psychological crutch. The committee then concluded:
"Since no means of quantitating these benefits is apparent the
Committee finds no basis for a judgment which would weigh
benefits versus hazards of smoking as it may apply to the general population. ' '1 4 But the general observations of the committee about the mental health benefits from smoking are weakened by the fact that they are supported very little by the
results of studies made on the reasons why people begin smoking. In a study made of 3,449 boys and 3,361 girls, grades 7-12,
in Newton, Massachusetts High School, the participants were
asked to give their reasons for beginning smoking, if they had,
and the reasons why they thought others began smoking. Answering both for themselves and for others, "conformity" led
all other reasons given by male smokers by a substantial
margin35 "Enjoyment and tension release" led desire to "i, .
press others" by a very small margin as the second ranking
reason, but there is a strong basis for believing that "enjoyment and tension release" does not rank that high as a reason
for beginning smoking. In speaking of themselves, 34.3% of
the smokers gave this as at least one of their reasons for beginning smoking, but only 15.0 % of the smokers gave this as one
of the reasons why they thought others began smoking. This
indicates that in speaking of themselves, smokers were either
(1) giving an excuse for why they smoked, or (2) were describing their reasons for satisfying their habit after it was formed,
or both. That (1) may be true is supported by the fact that
"enjoyment and tension release" would appear to be a more
flattering substantive reason, and thus a more solid basis of
self-justification, than either "conformity" or to "impress
others. ' 36 That (2) may be true is borne out by the fact that
nobody "enjoys" beginning smoking. The body's initial reaction
is to reject the foreign substances contained in the smoke resulting in nausea and sometimes vomiting.31 It is only after
34. Id. at 355-56.
35. Salber, Welsh & Taylor, Reasons for Smoking Given by Secondary School
Children, 4 J. HEALTH & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 118, 121 (1963).
36. Id. at 127, 128: "Smokers, in talking about themselves, apparently find
conformity, curiosity and enjoyment 'acceptable' reasons since they attribute these
to themselves in appreciable numbers. Adult emulation and the desire to impress
others also appear to be strong motivations as judged by smokers in relation to other smokers, but since they are given much less frequently as reasons for their own
smoking, it appears that they are 'less acceptable'. . . . Firstly, there may be a
genuine projective mechanism at play by which students attribute to others motives
they unconsciously have themselves and attribute to themselves motives which are
acceptable even though they may in fact be of small importance."
37. Smoking and Health '64, 353.
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the body is pounded into submission and builds up a tolerance
to nicotine, and at least a limited habituation has developed,
that one "enjoys" smoking. A substantial part of the "enjoyment" that then occurs comes from releasing the "tension"
caused by the gnawing, cigarette induced desire. Thus, the industry hoists itself by its own petard. The reasons of "conformity" and to "impress others," the first and probably second
real reasons, would seem to have no independent connotations
for mental health, but have meaning only in a context created
by the prior existence of smoking.
So, while the committee had no studies that provided it with
a quantitative measure of smoking's aid to mental health, causing it not to strike a balance between such aid and the great
physical harms it did find,3 8 it presented little evidence, and
little exists, that smoking does more than aid in curing the men39
tal ills created by its own existence and use.
The observations on mental health by the committee apparently spawned a great number of studies in this complex area.
The Surgeon General's 1967 Report, 49 the only subsequent report making reference to this aspect of the problem, stated that
many studies had been begun, but no reportable conclusions had
become available.41 So at this point there is essentially no evidence that cigarette smoking aids independently existing mental
ills, while there is overwhelming evidence that it is a great
destroyer of human life.
TOBACCO AND HEALTH

"A custome lothsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmfull
to the braine, dangerous to the lungs, and in the blacke
38. See text accompanying notes 40-53 infra.
39. This is strongly indicated by a special news item appearing in the Houston
Chronicle on June 18, 1968. It bore a San Francisco dateline and read:
DOCTOR SAYS SOME PEOPLE SHOULD SMOKE
San Francisco (UPI)-Even though they are slowly killing themselves, some
people are better off smoking, a psychiatrist told the American Medical Assn.
"Once you've got it, the smoking habit, it may well be that you shouldn't stop,"
said Dr. Sheldon Cohen of Atlanta.
Cohen said patients who have 'been ordered to give up cigarettes because of
serious disease frequently develop bad emotional disorders.
"All to, often, it brings about the unmasking of depression, aggression and
what have you," the doctor said.
Cohen, a nonsmoker, has researched withdrawal problems for 11 years and has
treated numerous patients who were trying to stop.
He cited the case of a patient who had cancer-prone lesions in the throat.
"Shortly after he quit smoking, this fellow went to a party, beat up his wife
and best friend and made quite a fool of himself," Cohen said.
"He and I both agreed he was better off with cigarettes."
40. Health Consequences '67.
41. Id. at 188.
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stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible
Stygian smoake of the pit that is bottomlesse."
-King James I, 1604
As quoted in the Houston Chronicle January 10, 1964.
On the basis of reliable information, it is estimated that
cigarette smoking causes at least 125,000 excess deaths per
year. 4 That is almost double the combined number of people
4
killed annually by automobile accidents, 43 the Viet-Nam War 4
4
and murder. 5 It has been established that smoking is causally
related to lung cancer, cancer of the larynx, bronchitis, coronary heart disease and emphysema, 4 and a strong associational
connection has been established between smoking and cancer of
the esophagus and urinary bladder, peptic ulcers, cirrhosis of
47
the liver, and the birth of smaller babies to smoking mothers.
And the increase in the death rates in these areas has roughly
parallelled the increase in the consumption of cigarettes. In 1910,
the per capital 6nsumption of cigarettes was 138; in 1930,
1,365; in 1940, 1,828; in 1950, 3,322, and in 1961, 3,986. Deaths
from arteriosclerotic, coronary, and degenerative heart disease
rose from 273,000 in 1940 to 578,000 in 1962; from emphysema,
deaths rose from 2,300 in 1945 to 25,416 in 1966, and from
lung cancer deaths rose from less than 3,000 in 1930 to 48,483
in 1965.48
The mortality ratio of smokers to nonsmokers among those
who die of lung cancer is 10.8 to 1; of bronchitis and emphysema, 6.1 to 1; of cancer of the larynx, 5.4 to 1; of coronary
4
disease, 1.7 to 1, and of those who die of all causes 1.68 to 1. 9
All thirty-five year old men who smoke from 10-19 cigarettes
per day will pay, on the average, with 5.4 years of their lives;
if they smoke 20-39 cigarettes per day with 6 years of their
42. Health Consequences '67, 13. See Appendix A; Stat. Abs. 1967, 10, Table
8. See Appendix B ; both appendices appear at the end of the footnotes.
43. There were 49,163 killed in automobile accidents in the United States in
1965..Stat. Abs. 1967, 59.
44. There were approximately 9,378 killed in the Viet Nam War in 1967. This
is not an official figure but has been established to be a reliable estimate.
45. There were 9,850 murders and non-negligent manslaughters in the United
States in 1965. Stat. Abs. 1967, 149.
46. Smoking and Health '64, 31-32; Public Health Serv., U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, The Health Consequences of Smoking, A Public Health Service
Review: 1967, 27-31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Health Consequences, '67].
47. Health Consequences '67, 33-36, 39.
48. Smoking and Health '64, 25-26; Public Health Serv., U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, The Health Consequences of Smoking, 1968 Supplement to the
1967 Public Health Service Review, 97, 136 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Health
Consequences Supp. 1968].
49. Smoking and Health '64, 29.
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lives and with 6.9 years of their lives if they smoke more than
40 cigarettes per day.50 That is, depending on the number of cigarettes per day used in the calculation, the cost is approximately
8 minutes of life per cigarette smoked-about the length of time
it takes to smoke it.
If we leave aside the illness, suffering, grief, and loss of life
caused by cigarette smoking, and express the loss only in economic terms, the figures are startling. Using men only, and
concentrating on the younger age groups 5' where premature
loss of life is most tragic, we determine that in 1966 there were
12,325 excess deaths in the 35-44 age bracket because of cigarette smoking. At 31 years each, the life expectancy of a 40-year
old man, this amounted to a loss of 382,075 man-years of life.
If we value a man-year of life at $4,000, the total loss is $1,528,300,000. Similarly, we find that in the 45-54 age bracket there
were 50,214 excess deaths in 1966. By using 23 years, the life
expectancy of a 50-year old man, and $3,000 per man-year
as the average economic value, we arrive at a loss of $3,464,766,000. The combined total for these two age brackets alone
is $4,993,066,000. And of course economic loss occurs from disabilities short of death. It has been estimated that we now lose
annually 77,000,000 excess man-days of work because of illnesses induced by cigarette smoking.5 2 At an average of $25
per day, that loss is $1,925,000,000 for a grand total of $6,918,066,000 in losses from these three items alone. If we should add
the remainder of the age brackets for men, and all the age
brackets for women, the total would undoubtedly exceed a loss
of $10,000,000,000 annually. The tobacco industry, in waging
its battles in Congress, points out defensively that it is a $10,000,000,000 industry 53 and of vital importance to the economy.
But looked at as an economic phenomenon alone, the balance
seems to be heavily on the debit side since, apart from the human tragedy it produces, the industry devours annually economic assets equal to its total worth.
50. Health Consequences Supp. 1968, 9-10.
51. See Appendix A at end of footnotes.
52. Health Consequences Supp. 1968, 6. The entire statement reads:
"Data from the National Health Survey provide a base for estimating that in
1 year in the United States an additional 77 million man-days were spent ill
in bed, and an additional 306 million man-days of restricted activity were experienced because cigarette smokers have higher disability rates than nonsmokers .... "
Since it could not be determined what overlapping, if any, might be in those
figures, only man-days of work lost were used.
53. Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678,
725 (1966).
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This is the tobacco industry and its fruits. Tobacco is neither
food nor medicine, and it is doubtful that it satisfies any significant desires other than those of its own creation.5

4

It is

certain, however, that it is one of the nation's leading producers
of death and other human tragedies. In applying any legal
principle in cases involving the cigarette industry, the above
facts bearing on its utility must be taken into account. Failure
to do so would be to decide cases in a conceptual vacuum.
It thus seems evident that no policy considerations based
on utility dictate shielding the cigarette manufacturing industry from strict tort liability, but, on the contrary, the low
utility of the industry and the gravity of the risks it poses
makes it an appropriate industry for the imposition of such
policy.
THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK

If strict liability is to be so extended, there would still remain
the crucial question of whether cigarette smokers are to be
barred from recovery because they have assumed the risks in'
volved in smoking. There has been comparatively little discussion of this problem 55 and the second function of this paper will
be to develop this issue in the light of the total relevant facts.
The defense of assumption of risk will be vigorously urged
by cigarette manufacturers regardless of the tort theory on
which plaintiffs seek to establish their liability. And based upon
the holdings in other products liability cases the defense will
likely be effective-6 unless the unique nature of cigarettes, and
the health hazards from their use, cause the adoption of a different policy in cigarette cases. 5 7 The convictions expressed in
54. A famous lung surgeon and medical authority has said: "The only good
thing that I know about tobacco is that it kills bugs. Nicotine does this. But there
is nothing good about it as far as human consumption is concerned."
Ochsner, Dabbling in Peath, Smoke Signals, July-September 1962.
55. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F. 2d 479, 485 (3d Cir.
1965) ; and Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
628, 718 (1966), contain some discussion on this point. Wegman's discussion is
brief and inadequate and that in Pritchard, a case that arose in 1953, will have
little relevance to future cases because of the wide dissemination of the information
contained in the Surgeon General's 1964 and subsequent reports. See Smoking and
Health '64, 355; Health Consequences '67, 27-31; Health Consequences Supp. 1968,
97, 136.
56. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967)
See cases cited note 17 supra; Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17
STAN. L. RaV. 1077, 1094 (1965), predicts, however, that ultimately defect as a
requirement and assumption of risk as a defense will both be dropped from products-liability cases.
57. It is not sound to consider assumption of risk except in the full context of
the fact situation in which it is invoked, since no conceptual term has real meaning apart from the setting in which it is to be applied.
"Let it be emphasized that each of these defensive doctrines is a variable or
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this paper will be cast as arguments that the defense of assumption of risk should not have its normal application in these
cases.
The first thing that should be said is that the defense of
assumption of risk has experienced growing disfavor since
the height of its application around the beginning of this century. 58 This is illustrated by its elimination by Workmen's Compensation Statutes, the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and
kindred statutes. Some states have narrowed its application by
judicial action. " Still others would eliminate it altogether as
an affirmative defense and leave its functions to contributory
inconstant and highly ambiguous and each is given meaning by the factual
content of the particular case and its environment. The assumption of risk
doctrine as a residuary doctrine of the group takes on many colorations and
any authoritative formula for making use of it will be helpful only so long as
it does not impinge on the freedom of a court to evaluate the factual and environmental data of the particular case to the end that the risk involved can
'be allocated to the one party or the other with a maximum of justice."
Green, Assumed Risk As a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77, 78 (1961).
58. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 450-68 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as Prosser]; Symposium, Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 1-166 (1961). One
of the writers in this symposium stated:
"Society has an interest in the well-being of its members. It seeks to shield
them from very grievous harm when there will be no appreciable gain. For the
most part this concern manifests itself only when the loss to the individual
has some more or less discernible impact on the welfare of others or the community at large. But the interest goes beyond this, perhaps as the mark of a
civilized society, to a concern for the individual himself. . . . Society takes an
interest in the individual for his own sake, without the necessity of piecing out
some altogether imagined effect on the community at large. His life, his safety,
his welfare are themselves matters of common concern in a society largely organized to promote them .. . "
Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 42 (1961).
Then addressing himself to a plaintiff's freedom of choice in assumption of risk
cases, he continued:
"Of course, the defendant can impose some burdens on the alternatives open to
the plaintiff, perhaps even with the purpose of coercing willingness, without
his conduct in exposing the plaintiff to a risk or invading his interest being
conclusively condemned. . . . But if the effect of his conduct is seriously to
impair the plaintiff's power to meet him on an equality, a judgment whose difficulty need not be emphasized, then the philosophy of choice is abandoned and
the defendant's conduct in invading the plaintiff's interest or exposing him to
a risk conclusively condemned.
"There has been no greater change in social policy over the past half century than on this question of when the plaintiff's power over his environment
is so reduced that it is best unqualifiedly to forbid the defendant to act in a
risky manner. In regard to certain classes of plaintiffs there has been a radically altered and notably more realistic appraisal of the alternatives practically open to them and the slightness of their power over the environment. The
change has come through both statute and judicial decision. Experience here
has been the great teacher as to the insufficiency of individual choice, no matter how intelligently exercised, to overcome social and economic disabilities."
Id. at 45, 50.
59. Hines v. Continental Baking Co., 334 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1960) ; West v.
Fontana Mining Corp., 150 S.E. 884 (N.C. 1929) ; Maulden v. High Point Bending
& Chair Co., 144 S.E. 557 (N.C. 1928) ; Ritter v. Beals, 358 P.2d 1080 (Ore.
1961) ; Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 374 P.2d 675 (Wash. 1962) ; Siragusa v.
Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962).
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negligence. ° And the disfavor it has increasingly incurred can
be attributed to the fact that, as applied, it has been essentially
a rigid, harsh doctrine, producing injustice in many individual
cases. It provided, especially in its earlier application, little
room for weighing the great variety of circumstances, of varying degrees of compulsion, under which the plaintiff had acted,
or for weighing the utility of the activity the defendant was
seeking to advance. Justice Frankfurter once described it in a
concurring opinion as a literary expression that had come to
be uncritically applied.61 The United States Supreme Court has
characterized the defense as being one judicially created to protect expanding industry from the "human overhead" inevitably
involved in its operation. 62 It hardly needs to be said, however,
that we do not need by judicial policy to provide a climate for
the expansion of the cigarette-manufacturing industry. On the
contrary, it would seem to be appropriate for courts to use their
full measure of judicial discretion to discourage its expansion.
And this is an area in which our courts, of all our branches of
government, may be the freest to act. The lobby pressures on
Congress are tremendous. 3
The elements of implied assumption of risk, as it would be
asserted in cigarette cases, are, first, that there be a risk created
by defendant; second, that the plaintiff "must not only know
of the facts whih-create the danger, but he must comprehend
60. Felgner v. Anderson, 133 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1965) ; McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963); McConville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962).
61. "The phrase 'assumption of risk' is an excellent illustration of the extent
to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a
literary expression ; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition ; and repetition soon
establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different
and-sometimes contradictory ideas.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943).
62. "Perhaps the nature of the present problem can best be seen against the
background of one hundred years of master-servant tort doctrine. Assumption
of risk is a judicially created rule which was developed in response to the
general impulse of common law courts at the beginning of this period to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead'
which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of industrialized business. The general purpose behind this development in the common law
seems to have 'been to give maximum freedom to expanding industry.
Id. at 58-59.
63. A congressman, responding to a survey by -the Christian Science Monitor,
stated:
"Let's face it, though. When you combine the money and power of the tobacco
and liquor interests with advertising agencies, newspapers, radios, and television .... there is too much political muscle involved to expect much accomplishment."
Gimlin, Regulation of the Cigarette Industry, 2 EDITORIAL IEsz-miac
RFP. 867,
869 (1967).
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and appreciate the danger itself ;1 64 and third, that plaintiff's
"choice to incur it [the risk] must be entirely free and voluntary." 65 As to the first of these elements, it cannot be seriously
questioned that cigarette manufacturers have created a grave
health risk by making and marketing cigarettes, and by urging
their use by massive and continuous advertising campaigns. The
existence and application of the second and third elements of
this defense raise much more difficult questions, however, and
require a more comprehensive analysis. It is here that additional
words of Justice Frankfurter in Tillier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R.6 6 have particular significance. He stated: "The notion of
'assumption of risk' as a defense-that is, where the employer
concededly failed in his duty of care and nevertheless escaped
liability because the employee had 'agreed' to 'assume the risk'
of the employer's fault-rested in the context of our industrial
society upon a pure fiction. 6 7 It is equally "pure fiction," speaking in the social context of our beginning teenage smokers
where normal teenage pressures are intensified by an incessant
bombardment of tempting advertising, to say that they assume
the health risk of smoking.
In dealing with these latter two aspects of assumption of
risk, one of the most important factors to bear in mind is that
almost all smokers begin while they are yet children. 68 One
study of the smoking habits of a group of high school students
shows that 40.2% of those approximately 15-17 years of age
considered themselves to be smokers.69 It is reasonable to assume
that if the study had involved 17-year-olds only, the percentage
would have been higher still. In fact, the United States Public
Health Service has reported that 50 percent of American teenagers have become regular smokers by the time they reach 18
years of age, and that more than 4,000 young people begin
64. W. PR0Sssn, THE LAW OF TORTS 462 (3d ed. 1964).
65. Id. at 461.
66. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
67. Id. at 69.
68. The legal significance of this fact is that the law has universally recognized that children lack competence and discretion. In Charbonneau v. MacRury,
153 A. 457, 462 (N.H. 1931), the court said:
"A minor, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is universally considered
to be lacking in judgment. His normal condition is one of recognized incompetency ....
It is a matter of common knowledge that the normal minor not
only lacks the adult's knowledge of the probable consequences of his acts or
omissions, but is wanting in capacity 'to make effective use of such knowledge
as he has. His age is a factor insofar as it is a mark of capacity. .. ."
69. Salber & MacMahon, Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students Related to Social Class and Parental Smoking Habits, 51 Am. J. PUBLIo HEALTH
1780-81 (1961).
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smoking every day. 0 Others "have concluded that by the early
college years the habit is well-formed and therefore hard to
break." About 10 percent develop the habit "before the teens."'"
The general prevalence of teenage smoking is a significant
part of the context in which the cigarette manufacturer operates. He casts his product into the free and unrestricted channels of commerce where he knows that children, heedless and
indiscreet, will be engulfed by exposure to them. He knows that
any amount and type of warning will not likely be wholly
effective, especially in view of his continuing program of seductive advertising.72 In this situation, as a manufacturer of a
product unavoidably dangerous and of low utility, he should
not be privileged to market it without paying for the damages
caused by its normal and intended use. 73 When we ask whether
a smoker, with full knowledge and understanding of the risk,
voluntarily and responsibly assumed that risk, we must remember, if we focus on the point of beginning, that we will be asking
that question about the very young. We will be asking it about
them before we consider them old enough to vote or to make,
though without fraud or overreaching of the other party, a binding contract involving the ordinary, transitory things of life. 74
The reason generally stated for this policy is to protect the
minor from being injured by his own improvident acts or from
the fraud of overreaching of others. Yet, if we say that by the
70. Gimlin, Regulation of the Cigarette Industry, 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH R.P.
867, 880-81 (1967).
71. Id. at 881.
72. "The psychology of teenagers being what it is, and living as they do under
the 'illusion of immortality', even the most bluntly-worded warning may be not
effective in overcoming the pressures to take up, or continue with, a habit that
has been made to symbolize a 'passport to adulthood'."
Federal Trade Commission, Report to Congress Pursuant To The Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (1968) [hereinafter cited as FTC Report '68] (concurring statement of Comm'r Elman).
73. "The likelihood that people who use the product will in fact take effective self-protective care is certainly a factor to be weighed in assessing the
reasonableness of a product's risk. Knowledge of the danger may make this likelihood greater, but it will not always do so. Although everyone may know
that a product will injuriously affect a few people, there may be no way for
an individual to tell whether he is one of the unfortunate few until it is too
late--until the injurious process has become irreversible. In such a case, unreasonable danger in putting out the product at all might be found more readily than in a case where the injurious tendency can be detected and avoided or
headed off before serious harm is done. ....
"
James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CAmiF. L. REv. 1550, 1555 (1966).
74. Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.D.S.C. 1961); Worman
Motor Co. v. Hill, 94 P.2d 865 (Ariz. 1939) ; Neimann v. Deverich, 99 Cal. App.2d
170, 221 P.2d 178 (1950) ; Casey v. Kastel, 237 N.Y. 305, 142 N.E. 671 (1924) ;
Wharen v. Funk, 31 A.2d 450 (Pa. 1943) ; Harvey v. Hadfield, 372 P.2d 985

(Utah 1962).
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time the cigarette habit is set these youngsters have assumed
the risk, we are saying that they are competent to responsibly
make a decision that may cost them up to 35 years of their lives.
It is certain that on the average it will cost them 5 or 6 years
5
of their potential existence.7
Further, the pressures under which teenagers begin smoking are very similar to those under which they buy that shiny
new automobile, a transaction we will let them disavow. While
the yearnings of the normal youth for the new automobile are
strong, the pressures to begin smoking are similarly great. An
investigation by a noted research team found the principal reasons reasons given by teenagers for beginning smoking were:
"Conformity to peer group," "Adult emulation," "To impress
others," "Curiosity and novel experience," "Rebellion against
authority," "Enjoyment and tension release," and miscellaneous
other reasons that did not fit into these categories. 76 Some of
these reasons, especially "Conformity to the peer group," "Adult
emulation," "Curiosity and novel experience," and "To impress
others," constitute very strong teenage pressures. All of us can
recall instances, perhaps our own, of the young man who wants
to impress that favorite young lady with his masculinity, adulthood, and urbanity, and who uses the nonchalant smoking of a
cigarette to make his point. Similarly, we can recall having the
experience, or of knowing of others who did, of being under
severe temptation to smoke because "friends" were doing it or
to avoid being thought of as lacking in daring. Those pressures
are pulsating and real and to the young, to whom middle age
is an eternity away, are likely to be overpowering, even though
they have all the facts about the risks involved. 77 Few children
75. It might be urged that contract ideas are not relevant here ; that personal
injury cases against cigarette manufacturers are tort cases, and that cases recognizing that children can commit torts, or be guilty of contributory negligence are
the most applicable. Apart from the point that assumption of risk has a contractual
ring to it, it should be remembered that in cases which hold that children can commit torts, the child's adversary is by assumption a completely innocent person
whose interests are to be balanced against those of the child tortfeasor. While the
child's adversary is not innocent where the issue is the child's contributory negligence, the child there, as well as where the issue is his primary negligence, is entitled to have the issue decided on the basis of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, his age, intelligence, and experience being among those to be considered.
Certainly no less consideration should be accorded the child in an assumption of
risk case, and it is the conviction reached in this paper that, all facts and circumstances considered, assumption of risk, as applied to them, should be rejected
as a matter of law.
76. Salber, Welsh & Taylor, Reasons for Smoking Given by Secondary School

Children, 4 J. HEALTH & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 118, 121 (1963).
77. "Furthermore, being a minor, he did not assume the risk of the accident

which caused his injuries, unless, in addition to a knowledge of the defects referred to, he knew the nature and extent of the danger, and had the discretion to
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would voluntarily exchange candy for promises of good, sound
teeth, or give it up because of warnings of the prospects of
false ones. Effectiveness of fact motivations with the young
will roughly equal their intrinsic strength discounted by the
time distance away.
These normal teenage pressures are intensified by the massive, continuous adyertising programs of the cigarette manufacturers. During 1967, cigarette manufacturers spent in excess
of 311 million dollars on all forms of advertising and more than
226 million dollars on television advertising alone.78 Such television advertising may depict young, handsome people smoking
in a happy, romantic mood, or associate smoking with the rugged, virile male mastering his machine, or surveying inspiring
scenes of open country.79 Such advertising may not be expressly
directed to teenagers, but in view of their known motivations
to smoke, it could hardly be made to appeal to them more.
Such advertising reaches the very young in saturatingproportions..In one month alone, January 1968, there were 1,827,420,000 television exposures to children between the ages of 2-11
years, or 44.5 exposures per child. In the same month, there
were 1,371,430,000 exposures to children between the ages of
12-17, or 60.88 exposures per child.80 And in the face of increasproperly weigh his liability to injury from it." Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Smith, 99
S.W. 743, 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), rehearing denied. In the case of beginning
cigarette smokers, there should be added: the will power to withstand the temptation to begin, knowledge of the force of the habit, and the difficulties of quitting.
Courts recognize that a child's discretion may not keep pace with his chronological
age: "And we may remark just here that the discretion of a minor does not always keep pace with his intelligence. His intellect may be cultivated and developed, and yet he may be more heedless than one of more 'tender years." Texas & P.
Ry. v. Brick, 20 S.W. 511, 514 (Tex. 1892).

78. FTC Report '68, 7.
79. Id. at 14-17.
80. Id. at 9-11.
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ing publicized evidence that cigarette smoking poses hazards to
health, the industry has increased its exposure per child for small
children from 39.27 in January 1967, to 44.5 in January 1968,
and for teenagers in the same period from 55.53 per child to
60.88.81 If we use an average of 50 exposures per month for the
total period, ages 2-17 inclusive, we find that the average child
is thus alluringly exposed to cigarette smoking a total of 9,600
times during the most impressionable years of its life. What
tremendous odds to overcome by parents who all too often
become to their teenage children symbols of opposition to fun
and the good things of the young life.
The lure of advertising is only one of the bases for objection
to it. In the light of present knowledge, it can be said to be outr4ght misrepresentation. The Federal Trade Commission has
recommended to Congress that all cigarette advertising on radio
and television be banned.8 2 Commissioner Elman, in a statement attached to the Commission's report, concurred in this
recommendation and stated:
"The avalanche of cigarette advertisements on television
and radio is a national disgrace. The industry spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year on such advertisingand the rate of expenditure is increasing-to obscure the
fact that cigarette smoking is a dangerous and harmful habit
which each year shortens the lives of hundreds of thousands
of people....
"The airwaves are saturated with an endless barrage of
commercials pounding home the deceptive message that cigarette smoking is a pleasant and satisfying habit enjoyed by
healthy and attractive people ...
"1-3
What the industry is doing, viewed most charitably, is telling half truths and it has long been held to be implied misrepreChildren (2-11)
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83. Id. (concurring statement of Comm'r Elman). (Emphasis added.)
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sentation to intentionally relate a half truth as though it were
the whole truth. s4 So, if there are many happy and attractive
people who smoke, and there are, it is a tacit misrepresentation
to drum that fact home daily without revealing the tragic results from smoking that are now established with certainty to
exist.5 5 The Federal Trade Commission's 1968 report to Congress
discloses how the themes of cigarette advertising are adroitly
selected and exploited to make cigarette smoking appear to be
the socially attractive thing to do while subtly attempting to
allay all apprehensions that one might entertain about such
smoking.8 6 It is deliberate, subtle misrepresentation on a grand
scale.
One particular project of cigarette manufacturers designed
to mislead was given specific treatment by the commission in
its 1968 report to Congress.8" It went beyond product advertising.
A public relations executive retained by one of the tobacco companies wanted to.- get a favorable article on cigarette smoking published in True magazine. He and the editor of True got
an author who was predominantly a sports, writer, to prepare
the article "To Smoke or Not to Smoke-That is Still the Question." He was paid a total of $2,000 for his work. The Public
Health Service in a post publication analysis concluded that the
article contained many half truths, distortions, and- misrepresentations. Of the four editors of True who considered the article, three approved it for publication, but one of them stated:
"I find it completely biased and if actually not hogwash, pretty
damn misleading." ' The editor who disapproved stated: "Let's
really face it: what's wrong here is that our writer didn't go
out like a good reporter and do his legwork and his homework.
The result is the purest trash-dated, biased and without present
84. In a case where the seller revealed .the existence of easements for two unopened streets across land he was selling, but did not disclose the existen*ce of a

third, the court said: "The enumeration of two streets, described as unopened but
projected, was a tacit representation that the land to be conveyed was subject to

no others, and'certainly subject to no others materially affecting the value of the
purchase." Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (1931).
85. Even the warning presently appearing on cigarette packages: "Caution:
Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health" is itself misleading. Cigarette
smoking hurts all smokers.
"Every regular cigarette smoker is injured, though not in the same degree. Cigarette smoking kills some, makes others lung cripples, gives still others far more than their share of illness and loss of work days. Cigarette
smoking is not a gamble; all regular cigarette smokers studied at autopsy show
the effects." (Medical Bulletin on Tobacco, December 1967, April 1968.)
FTC Report '68 (concurring statement of Comm'r Elman).

86. FTC Report '68 at 12-21.
87. Id at 24-30.
88. Id. at 26.
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justification."8 9 The reason the writer had not done his legwork
was because an attorney for one of the tobacco companies supplied him with his materials. When True was published and distributed, ads costing $67,146.68 were bought by the tobacco companies and run in 63 newspapers quoting such statements from
the article as "there is absolutely no proof that smoking causes
human cancer." The companies then purchased over a million
reprints of the article which they distributed or caused to be
distributed. Mailing lists were obtained from sources for some
of those caused to be distributed without disclosing to such
sources the tobacco companies' interest in the project, and some
of those distributed were made to appear to be coming from
the editors of True. Among these were 414,820 sent to medical
and communications personnel, biological scientists, educators,
government officials, security analysts, lawyers and other opinion leaders.
Such questionable practices by the industry make believable
the contention that its other advertising is deceptive by cold
and deliberate calculation.
The consequences of this deception are believed to be legally
significant if cigarette manufacturers should defend against
future damage suit actions by invoking assumption of risk.
There would be significance for all cases, but especially so in
those involving persons who began smoking in their teens or
younger. Even without a setting of fraud or deceptive advertising, courts have refused in many cases, as a matter of public
policy, to apply to children the doctrine of implied assumption
of risk where otherwise the facts for doing so were strong. The
action in Chicago, R.I. & E.P. Ry. v. Easley9° was by a 17-year-old
employee against his employer for injuries incurred when the
walls of the gravel pit in which he was working caved in. Defendant asked for an instruction that if the dangers of the wall
caving were as open and obvious to the plaintiff as they were
to the defendant, then the plaintiff would have assumed the risks
of his employment. The court in approving the denial of that instruction said:
"In the case of a minor, on the other hand, the defense
of an assumption of ordinary risks is viewed as one which is
merely conditional upon production of specific and positive
evidence going to show that the risk in question was as a
89. Id. at 27.
90. 149 S.W. 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), rehearing denied.
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matter of fact comprehended. In short, where a minor is concerned, ordinary risks are for evidential purposes always
treated at the outset of the inquiry as extraordinary, and the
burden of establishing the servant's comprehension of the
particular risk is cast upon the employer ....91
"[T] he law is not as willing to charge a minor with the
assumption of risks attendant upon employment as a man
of mature years." 92
Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co.9 3 involved a child labor
law which prohibited the employment of children under 15 years
of age around certain types of dangerous machinery. The court
held that "A boy employed in violation of the statute is not
chargeable with contributory negligence or with having assumed
the risks of employment in such occupation. ' 94 There are in
most, if not all, states laws against selling cigarettes to children
below a certain age. While cigarette manufacturers do not sell
cigarettes directly to children below the prohibited age, they
launch them into the channels of trade, knowing that through
vending machines and other outlets children can and will buy
them. The manufacturers then seek to entice them to do so by
a barrage of attractive advertising. Surely the parasitic cigarette manufacturer should fare no better than the employer who
engages the youngster in the basically wholesome activity of
work and pays him for his services.
The courts have made similar holdings to that in Lenahan
where no employer-employee relation in violation of statute
existed. In Bonner v. Moran,95 a 15-year-old boy sued a 'surgeon
for taking skin from him for a skin graft though the plaintiff
had knowingly consented to the performance of the operation.
The trial court had given an instruction that if the child was
capable of appreciating and did appreciate the nature and consequences of the operation, and did expressly or impliedly consent, there would be no liability. The court of appeals held this
charge to be erroneous. It said the basic consideration was
91. Id. at 789; accord, Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 194 So. 353
(Fla. 1940) ; Tabert v. Zier, 368 P.2d 685 (Wash. 1962).
92. Hamilton v. Redeman, 97 P.2d 194, 200 (Ore. 1939). This case also draws
a sharp distinction between knowing something is dangerous and understanding
and appreciating the risk with sufficient fullness to make an intelligent decision
as to whether to encounter it. Id.
93. 67 A. 642 (Pa. 1907).
94. Id. at 643; accord, Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 225 S.W. 887 (Ark. 1920)
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1959) ; Dusha v. Virginia &
Rainy Lake Co., 176 N.W. 482 (Minn. 1920).
95. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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whether the proposed operation was for the benefit of the child,
being done to save his life or limb. The court concluded that the
nature of the operation and the possible consequences were such
that they required a mature mind to understand26 How much
more is that true of the young smoker who is pulled and hauled
between the sober warnings by his elders of the dangers of
smoking cigarettes and the contradictory claims of the industry
backed by subtle and deceptive advertising.
In still another situation, the law protects children against
the consequences of their indiscretions and their own inability
to protect themselves. A previously chaste girl under a certain
age, usually 18, cannot give a valid consent to sexual intercourse though, in fact, consent may be willingly given. In a
number of cases such girls have brought suit for damages
against the male participants and recovered.9 Initial sex relations with unmarried girls of that age is looked upon by society
as a serious violation of their persons. Encouraging a child to
start down a habit forming road from which the weakness of
his will may never let him return, and which may cost him many
years of his life, should be regarded as equally serious.
The policy which causes the law to extend protection to
minors in the normal, fair, and open transactions of life, often
when the stakes are comparatively low, should operate to prevent the defense of assumption of risk being used against them
when years of their lives are at stake, when planned deception
is used to encourage them to incur the risk, and when the
product of the defendant inflicting the harm has little, if any,
utility.
The defense of assumption of risk requires that defendant
establish, among other things, that plaintiff was aware of the
risk at the time he acted. While reliance by plaintiff on the
implied representations of the defendant that its product is
harmless is not essential to an action based on strict liability in
tort,"" the defendant should not be able to claim, as a matter of
96. Id. at 123; see also Wellman v. Fordson Coal Co., 143 S.E. 160 (W. Va.
1928), holding defendant liable for the death of an 11-year-old boy occurring while
he was throwing powder on a fire, the dangers of which he was established to
be aware. The defendant had not enticed the child to use the powder-as cigarette
manufacturers do children to use cigarettes-he had only negligently left it exposed.
97. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 109 (3d ed. 1964), citing Gaither v.
Meacham, 108 So. 2 (Ala. 1926) ; Glover v. Callahan, 12 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 1937) ;
Bishop v. Liston, 199 N.W. 825 (Neb. 1924) ; Priboth v. Haveron, 139 P. 973
(Okla. 1914) ; Hough v. Iderhoff, 139 P. 931 (Ore. 1914).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), Comment m, Warranty. "Reliance, of course, would not be a requisite under strict liability in tort."
2 L. FRUTmER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[5] (d) (1968).
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law, that plaintiff was aware of a risk which defendant incessantly and over long periods of time had been, by its advertising,
telling plaintiff did not exist., In analogous situations involving
adults, even where the risk was open and obvious, defendants have been unable to establish as a matter of law the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.100 The
underlying reason is that stated by the court in Bishop v. E. A.
Strout Realty Agency, Inc., "[I]t was never any credit to the
law to allow one who had defrauded another to defend on the
ground that his own word should not have been believed. ' ' 11
In fact, there is a substantial line of products-liability cases beginning with Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,10 2 which have gone
further and recognized such misrepresentations as the basis for
a cause of action by the consumer against the manufacturer.
That proof of reliance in the traditional sense is not necessary
99. There should be no problem about presuming that such misleading representations have often reached substantially all children when such children in television audiences alone have 9,600 exposures between the ages of 2-17. See text following note 80 supra.
100. In Beck v. Texas Co., 148 S.W. 295, 298 (Tex. 1912), the court said:
"It is an established principle of law recognized by the almost unanimous
current of judicial authority that if the servant complains or directs attention
to a defect in the machinery to 'be used by him, or danger to result from the
use of same, and the master or his vice principal assures such servant that he
can use such machinery with safety and directs that he proceed to use same,
the servant, under such circumstances, will not, as matter of law, be held to
have assumed the risk, or to have been guilty of contributory negligence, in
relying upon the superior knowledge of such master or representative and
continuing the use of such machinery, unless 'the danger of using such defective
machinery is so apparent as to rebut the idea that reliance was placed upon
such assurance. Wrong, under such circumstances, will not be imputed to the
servant, as he would have the right to act upon the advice or assurance of
the master or his vice principal, and the master, under such state of facts,
would be estopped to impute assumed risk or contributory negligence, as matter of law, to the servant; but the issue would be one properly to ,be determined by the jury ...."
See also De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F. 2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954).
Defendant had sold plaintiff a baling machine and sent two men to demonstrate
its use. Plaintiff was later hurt when doing what he had seen the demonstrators
do. The court said:
"It is probably true, as defendant insists, that there is no duty to warn
against the obvious, that is, that defendant had no duty to warn plaintiff to
stay away from the front of the chute since the risk of injury by being carried into the rolls was clear. But that does not end the matter. Although there
may have been no duty to warn plaintiff to stay clear of the chute, manifestly,
there was a duty to refrain from directing him to place himself there by representations that only by so doing could the baler be made to do its work. The
negligence was not in failing to warn plaintiff to stay away but in demonstrating to him that it was proper and safe to come near, because defendant,
in those circumstances, had every reason to know that such instruction would
cause injury, and it is thus liable for the natural consequences of its act."
Id. at 413.
101. 182 F.2d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 1950).
102. 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932).
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is shown by the fact that ones other than the purchaser have
10 3
recovered in such cases.
The deceptive character of cigarette advertising is significant from yet another point of view. Even though the plaintiff
was aware of the risk, the defendant cannot prevail on the defense of assumption of risk unless the plaintiff unreasonably
exposed himself to that risk. In De Eujenio v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co.,104 the court said:
"We are told that plaintiff was an adult farmer of at least
average intelligence and was familiar with farm equipment;
that he had observed the baler in operation on three prior
occasions and that the risk of injury from the rolls was
obvious; consequently, he voluntarily exposed himself to a
known danger. But . . . that alone is not enough to bar
plaintiff as a matter of law; to have that effect the voluntary exposure must be unreasonable, and it is for the trier
of fact to say whether that inference should be made. The
weighty factor which defendant seems to overlook is that
plaintiff was doing just what defendant's demonstrators had
done. Conduct which might otherwise bar a plaintiff as a
matter of law must be looked at in a different light when
the seller's experts have indicated that that is the proper
way to operate the purchased machine. Under these circumstances, whether plaintiff's reliance upon the experts' in'0 °5
structions was unreasonable was for the jury.'
It would, therefore, seem that whether young people unreasonably exposed themselves to the risks of cigarette smoking
would, as a minimum, be a question for the jury under all the
facts and circumstances. Among the facts to be considered
would be the age, intelligence, and experience of the child; the
influences and pressures on the young; the normal state of
daring and indiscretion characteristic of his age, and the constant stream of defendant's attractive and seductive advertising
to which he had been exposed. It would seem, however, to be
103. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16.04[4] (a) & (b)
1968. The authors conclude proof of reliance should not be required.
104. 210 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954).
105. Id. at 413-14. (Footnotes omitted.) Cf. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 171
N.E. 694, 698 (N.Y. 1930)

where the court did not find assumption of risk as a

matter of law, though a father, in passing around a blocked sidewalk, led his child
into a street where there were obvious traffic hazards. Insofar as the record discloses, the father was under pressure to go into the street only to do Saturday
night shopping and could have avoided all danger by retreating around the block
on which -the obstruction occurred. See also Johnson v. City of Rockford, 35 Ill.
App. 2d 107, 182 N.E.2d 240 (1962).
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much more in keeping with the state and trend of the law to say
as a matter of law, based upon public policy, that one who begins
smoking as a child does not at the time of beginning assume
the risks involved.
THE YOUNG SMOKER BECOME ADULT
Legal undertakings of the child which extend into adulthood
will become binding in accordance with their terms if not disavowed within a reasonable time after attaining majority. So
it might be urged, everything said about the minor being conceded, the child-become-adult will be said to have assumed all
the risks of smoking if he continues thereafter. This is a neat,
superior-attitude type of theory, but it is not realistic. It treats
too lightly the strength of the cigarette habit. 10 6 Regardless of
what the scientists say about the limited addiction characteristics of nicotine, and about the basis of the cigarette habit being
primarily psychogenic, 107 the habit for most is a clinging monster and extremely difficult to break. One noted medical authority has called the habit an addiction. He said:
"Now if the cigarette people were sincere in wanting
to produce a safer cigarette, they could make cigarettes out
of those nicotine-free tobaccos. But they don't. Why don't
they? It is the nicotine that produces the addiction, and the
manufacturers are not going to put a product on the market
that isn't going to get one addicted. Their tactics are exactly
the same as those of the dope peddler. Once the customer is
addicted, they know they have him....
"Smoking is an addiction. How much of an addiction it is
difficult for me to say because never having been a smoker,
I don't know. I have told many patients that if they did not
stop smoking they would lose their legs. They were frightened, of course, but they could not stop smoking. They continued, and have lost their legs. Now any man who continues
doing a thing which he knows is going to cause gangrene in
his legs, has an addiction."108
106. "Even now, assumption of the risk presents special difficulties in connection with cigarette smoking. Given the habit forming nature of cigarettes, it is
questionable how voluntarily many consumers are continuing to smoke. Moreover,
there are no warnings on cigarette packages of a sort to bring home the gravity
of the risk." Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 371 (1965).

107. Smoking and Health '64, 349-54.
108. Ochsner, Dabbling in Death, Smoke Signals, July-September 1962.
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Out of a group of 75 who wanted to quit smoking badly
enough to attend an anti-smoking clinic where they got professional help, only 25 had been able to quit and stay quit at the
end of one year. 10 9 This figure is borne out by other studies. 110
After having noted that some could quit, Blakeslee stated:
"For many others. quitting becomes a long and often
agonizing struggle; probably most persons are the offagain; on-again kind of soldier in the battle against cigarettes ....
Breakdowns occur particularly when the new exsmoker feels stress, thinks he needs some comfort, when the
hunger or psychological desire becomes powerfully severe
after a meal, during the coffee break, or when the cocktail
hour arrives."1'
The earlier a person starts smoking, the more difficult he
finds it is to stop,' 112 and the greater the likelihood that he will
prematurely die. 13 In the world of reality, it is thus clear that
among those who want to quit badly, much less than half can
succeed, and the younger they begin the more difficult it is for
them to stop, and the greater the likelihood of their premature
death. The strength of the habit is such that the weak of will, a
majority among us, will never be able to overcome it. If we are
to ask and answer, in the context of reality, the question
whether the child-become-adult smoker has assumed the risk,
we must consider that inescapable fact. Stated more brutally
and more bluntly, the question is: are the millions among us
who are unable to resist the temptation to begin smoking,
usually when children, and who as adults are too weak of will to
quit, fair game for liability free exploitation by a high powered
industry bent on exploiting such weaknesses for gain? It seems
clear that they should not be. The defendant's duty should not
be determined with respect to a theoretical man of high prudence and strong will-a condition that never has and never will
universally exist-but should be determined in the light of
frailties known to exist in the masses-a condition that does
and always will exist.
109. IV Medical Bulletin on Tobacco No. 1 (1966).
110. Blakeslee, It Is Not Too Late To Stop Smoking Cigarettes! Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 386, 18-20 (reporting on the results of several studies).
111. Id. at 18-19.
112. Id. at 19.
113. "Men who began smoking before age 20 have a substantially higher
death rate than those who began after age 25." Health Consequences Supp. 1968, 3.
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In situations where less was at stake and the pressures no
greater, the law has seen fit, as a matter of public policy, to
protect adult individuals from their own inability to protect
themselves. The courts consistently hold that an adult does not
assume risks by knowingly working in their presence when' such
risks are created by his employer's violation of safety statutes
intended for the employee's protection."1 While the defense of
assumption of risk has been eliminated in most employer-employee relationships by Workmen's Compensation and kindred
statutes, some courts have eliminated it altogether or narrowed
its application by independent judicial action in relationships
11 5
not covered by those statutes.
Further, in consumer commercial transactions the courts
are more and more finding the consumer not bound by disclaimers of liability contained in the contract of purchase. 16 In
some of the cases,1 1 7 discussion occurs about the obscurity of
the disclaimer provision, but it is apparent from a reading of
the cases as a whole that the decisions are policy ones based
on the inequality of the bargaining positions of the parties, and
on the manufacturers being the more socially desirable risk
bearer. The Restatement (Second) concurs by providing disclaimers shall not provide a defense in products-liability
cases." s Then there is the broad general area of adhesion contracts whereby parties under varying types of pressure are relieved from the binding effects of consents apparently given. 1 9
114. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 468 (3d ed. 1964) ;,Suess v. Arrowhead
Steel Prods. Co., 180 Minn. 21, 230 N.W. 125 (1930), a case cited by Prosser, involved a plant superintendent who had worked for 6 years in the presence of the
risks created by his employer's statutory violation.
115. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 467 (3d ed. 1964), citing Inouye v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 348 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1960). See also cases cited notes
59 & 60, supra.
116. Steele v. J. I. Case Co., 419 P.2d 902 (Kan. 1966); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965), in which disclaimers in products
liability cases are declared to be ineffective. See generally Franklin, When Worlds
Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Products Cases, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 974, 1004 (1966) ; Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 423 P.2d 926
(Wash. 1967).
117. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69

(1960).

118. See

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A, Comment m (1965). It

might be argued that the informed smoker assumes the risk of a specific; known
danger from a specific, known defect, while the automobile purchaser would be, by
his disclaimer, merely agreeing to assume the risks of a danger being there. But in
the main, this is a difference represented by implied and express assumptions of
risk. Both have been recognized by the courts. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
450-69 (3d ed. 1964).
119. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559 n.20 & § 1376 (1952). See also ALJ UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1962) ; JONES, FARNSWORTH, & YOUNG, CONTRACTS 150-94 (1965).
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The adult cigarette smoker, seen in the perspective of his
past and present experiences, is under pressures as great as the
greatest of these, and much more severe than in some. To allow
the defense of assumption of risk in cigarette cases would be to
run counter to the growing humanitarism impulse that has
characterized recent decisions where defendants have sought
to capitalize on persons' immaturity, bargaining weakness or
other human frailty.
OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS

The decisions of the courts in the cigarette smoking cases
will be policy ones whatever the legal language used. The decisions that allow the defense of assumption of risk will be no
less policy decisions than will be those which deny it. The total
facts here are so unlike those in any other areas where the
doctrine has been invoked that the decisions, whichever way they
go, must of necessity be based on policy. But policy decisions
fashioned to accomplish justice within the broad framework
of basic legal principles are in the finest tradition of the common law judiciary.
Another factor seems to bear significantly on the decision
to be made here. Appropriate to any tort decision in a new area
is the comparative quality of the conduct of the adversary parties. 120 In a number of situations, the courts in civil actions have
held the intentional wrongdoer to a stricter accountability than
they have less culpable act--. This has been done both by restricting the limiting role of proximate cause and by adjusting
the defenses available to the wrongdoer. 1 21 While it may strike
one as a harsh thing to say about industrial leaders who have
enjoyed a mantle of respectability that their present conduct in
making and aggressively marketing cigarettes constitutes the
intentional infliction of death, there seems to be no other permissible characterization of it. 122 One intends the consequences which are
120. "The role of assumption of risk in products liability cases is properly a
limited one. It applies only to actions of the consumer that shift the blame from
the manufacturer to him." (Emphasis added.) Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 371 (1965).
121. W. PRossER, Turm LAW OF TORTS 30, 302, 436 (3d ed. 1964).
122. Cf. Commonwealth v. Feinberg, 211 Pa. Super. 100, 234 A.2d 913 (1967)
wherein defendant sold from his store in a skid-row area cans of high percentage
solidified methyl alcohol marked: "Institutional Sterno. Danger. Poison; not for
home use. For commercial and industrial use only." This was sold to residents of
the area without further warning and without specifically calling attention to the
warning on the cans. Deaths occurred from its use, and defendant was convicted
of involuntary manslaughter. In affirming the court said:
"In the light of the recognized weaknesses of the purchasers of the product,
and appellant's greater concern for profit than with the results of his actions,
he was grossly negligent and demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard
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known to follow with substantial certainty from his actions. 123
Stated conservatively, there is now substantial certainty that
the making and aggressive marketing of cigarettes will cause
thousands of premature deaths annually. In known certainty
of results, there is no difference between the actions of cigarette manufacturers, who make, sell, and promote the use of
their deadly product, and the angry man who fires his gun into
a crowd. Neither knows who is to die, but both know with substantial certainty that someone will. To be sure, the cigarette
manufacturers will claim that they only make attractively available the means of death, and that others, much as in the case of
the gun or automobile, actively administer the lethal product. But
contrary to the gun and automobile examples, the normal and
only use of cigarettes-a use aggressively promoted by cigarette manufacturers-is one that unavoidably produces the death
of many users without the diverting or abusive actions of anyone. This cannot be said, when it can be said at all, in anything approaching the same degree with respect to any other
product, and certainly cannot be said with respect to rabies
vaccine, blood plasma, new drugs, automobiles, guns, sharp
knives, hammers, butter, sugar, or castor oil, products with which
many have sought to compare them. The only benefits advanced
as justification for the massive loss of life and other physical
impairments are the possible contributions of cigarette smoking to mental health, but there is ample basis to question whether
such smoking contributes significantly to the cure of any mental or nervous disorders other than those of smoking's own
creation. 124 This makes the utility of the cigarette manufacturing industry very, very low, and the utility of a defendant's
conduct, as well as the moral quality of his acts, have always
been important elements when balancing the respective claims V
of plaintiffs and defendants.125
An interesting phenomenon is seen to be at work here. If
an individual was found to be intentionally preying for profit
on the known disabling frailties of a small group, say a family,
to induce them to begin and continue to use a habit-forming
product known to all of them to take an average of six years
for the welfare of those whom he might reasonably have expected to use the
product for drinking purposes."
Id. at 917. See also Tidd v. Skinner, 122 N.E. 122 247 (N.Y. 1919), where the court
held a jury could have found a retail druggist to have inflicted "willful injury" by
selling heroin to an 18-year-old boy under circumstances producing addiction.
123. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 32 (3d ed. 1964).

124. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
125. W. PROSSER,THE LAW OF TORTS 16, 151 (3d ed. 1964).
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of their lives, we would condemn him as antisocial and find a
way to punish him.12 6 But our criminal law developed long ago
when our relationships were simpler, more direct, and better
defined. We can easily see the personal wrong in that situation.
But given the anonymity and diffused responsibility of corporate action, directed, through established business operations,
to the disabling frailties of undetermined millions, and which
produces many tens of thousands of deaths annually, we are
likely to remain somewhat unmoved by it. It is a variant of
the psychology of the big lie which has been so skillfully used
by manipulators of the masses. The fallacy of this idea seemed
to have captured the mind of a writer 127 who recently rejected
enterprise tort liability for the tobacco industry, and concluded
assumption of risk must be applied, since to do otherwise might
cause the tobacco industry to have to pay for 125,000 lives per
year. That he found to be inconceivable. I assume from the general tenor of his comments that had the potential number of
lives for which liability might have been found had been 1,000,
he would have favored enterprise liability. The logic and
social policy justification for that distinction are difficult to
see. If an industry is unavoidably taking only a few lives in
the course of its operations, we require it to pay for them
through Workmen's Compensation or some other form of strict
liability; but if the ultimate, unavoidable effect of its operations is mass destruction of life, enterprise liability should
not be imposed since that would impair its ability to continue
its operations and to take its predictable quota of human lives.
And that without inquiry into the utility of the defendant's
operations.' 28 This position assumes a sanctity of the status quo
with respect to products and the right to produce them, particularly those of low utility "whose norm is danger," which
is believed to be unjustified. We survived the passing of the
buggy whip industry, a valid one in its day, and I am sure
we can survive the passing of many more when they outlive
their social usefulness. Prohibition of the manufacture of cigar126. See cases cited note 122 supra.
127. Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
-678-753 (1966).
128. This sort of thinking to some extent permeates RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, Comments i, k (1965), especially that on whiskey and tobacco.
A noted torts authority, speaking of comment k, stated: "If a product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to exempt the manufacturer
from liability on the ground that any other sample of his product would produce
like harm. If we scrutinize deviations from a norm of safety for imposing liability,
should we not scrutinize all the nore the product whose norm is danger?" Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REV. 363, 368 (1965).
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ettes, their sale or smoking is not proposed-it is proposed only
that the cigarette manufacturing industry pay the inevitable,
and thus intentional, cost of its present system of operations.
If it cannot do that and survive, it has no basis on which to
claim a right to stay.
RESTATEMENT

OF TORTS

(SECOND),

SECTION

402A

AND THE

CIGARETTE CASES

If the comments to Section 402A of the Restatement are
uncritically accepted and applied, the result will be that the
manufacturers of little killers like high utility automobiles,
with defects that constitute variations from the norm, will be
held strictly liable, though adult purchasers for a consideration
knowingly sign disclaimers in arms length bargains; while the
manufacturers of big killers, such as low utility whiskey and
cigarettes, whose norm is danger, will be free to promote death,
liability free, based on plaintiff's implied assumption of risk
though no disclaimers are filed and no consideration is received.
It will be legally fatal, inadvertently and in the exercise of
high care, to deviate slightly from the norm,'2 9 though the purchaser expressly agrees for a consideration to assume the risks
of your having done so, while the approval of the law is yours
if you make and market a product known to be inevitably dangerous for its normal and intended use, though assumption
of risk is implied only, and is clouded by factors of immaturity,
gripping habit and a babble of deceptive and ,confusing advertising. Surely the courts will not follow such false analogies
as those contained in Comment i which equates cigarettes to
butter and sugar to reach such absurd results. 130 The observation of Ashhurst, Justice, is reassuring here. He said in Pasley v. Freeman:1"1 ". . . I have so great a veneration for the law
as to suppose that nothing can be law which is not founded on
common sense or common honesty."
In addition to the false analogies contained in Comment i,
it is believed that the commentators fell into another error that
contributes to confusion and erroneous results. They have attempted to define what are essentially physical characteristics
129. In some products liability cases, the evidence is very close as to whether
there was in fact a deviation at all. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267,
270-71 (5tb Cir. 1963).
130. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1965) ; Note, Product Liability
and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 294-303, 315-19
(1966).
131. 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 456 (K.B. 1789).
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or qualities in terms of what the user knows, or is caused to
know by the seller. In Comment g, the existence of a "Defective
condition" is made to depend in substantial part on whether
the product leaves the sellers' hands "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer.

.

.

." But "Defective

condition" is in reality a physical property and has nothing
to do, strictly speaking, with what the consumer contemplates.
What the consumer contemplates has something to do with
whether there should be liability on the seller, but that is because of the precautions we assume the consumer will take
and its bearing on the application of assumption of risk; not
because it changes the physical characteristics of the product.
So what the consumer contemplates would be much more at
home if it was left to be considered under the principles of assumption of risk. Similarly, in Comment j, the condition of
being "defective and unreasonably dangerous" is made to turn
on whether proper warning has been given. It is stated: "Where
warning is given ....

a product ...

is not in defective condi-

tion, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." But it is submitted
that we are required to give warning because the product is
physically in a "defective" condition that makes it "unreasonably dangerous," and that giving the warning does nothing to
transform that physical condition. Again, giving the warning
has something to do with whether one is likely to get hurt by
the defective product and whether the seller should be liable if
he does, but that stems from the expected or required conduct
of the consumer, matters properly to be considered under assumption of risk, and not from the effect the warning has on
the product itself. How inapplicable the discussions on "Warning" in Comment j are to cigarette smoking is revealed by the
statement that: "Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if followed, is not
in a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
(Emphasis added.) No warning on a cigarette package could
make them "safe for use if ...

followed," except a warning not

to use them at all, 13 2 and in the face of the known immaturity
of many users and the strength of the cigarette habit, the seller
would have no basis to assume that even if he gave such a warn132. "Even 'light' smokers, who smoke less than 10 cigarettes per day, have
from 2.8 to 4.6 fewer years of life expectancy than corresponding nonsmokers."
Health Consequences Supp. 1968, 9.
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ing it would be "heeded" by more than a few. This Comment
further shows that the commentators expect the product to
cease to be defective and unreasonably dangerous because of
consumer reaction to "warnings" or "contemplated conditions,"
a phenomenon better treated under assumption of risk.
The whole effort of the Restatement commentators to give
a closed definition to "Defective condition" runs counter to the
reactions of many others who have considered the matter. A
number of writers have concluded the term should remain flexi1 3
ble and open-ended.
It makes a significant difference where these matters of
knowledge are treated. If their function is to alter what are
essentially physical characteristics, as the Restatement commentators have used them, the test of their effectiveness appears to
be an objective one. This might be debatable if we looked only
at the phrase "condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer" contained in Comment g, but objectivity is indicated by
the last paragraph of Comment j next above quoted. 1 34 If a
warning is given, says the quoted portion of Comment j, the
seller can assume it will be read, understood, and heeded regardless of the reasons for not doing so, and regardless of how
foreseeable it might have been to the seller that, under all the
135
circumstances, it would not be so read, understood, and heeded.
The mere giving of the warning, concludes the Comment, cures
the product of its physical defects and removes its unreasonably
dangerous properties.
133. "It is not necessary in the context of this case to attempt to define the
outer limits of the term 'defect'. . . . Defectiveness of defendant's carpeting is
conceded. Suffice it to say the concept is a broad one. The range of its operation must be developed as the problems arise and by courts mindful that
the public interest demands consumer protection."
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965). "Defects must remain an accordion-like, open-ended term." Kessler, Products Liability,
76 YALE L.J. 887, 930 (1967).
"A defect may be variously defined; as yet no definition has been formulated
that would resolve all cases." Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965). The author then
at 367-72 examines a number of bases for defining defect, including these used in
the Restatement, and found them all to suffer serious shortcomings. He then concluded: "The complications surrounding the definition of a defect suggest inquiry
as to whether defectiveness is the appropriate touchstone of liability. Id. at 372.
134. Even if Comment j is subjective, it goes only to what the "ultimate consumer" "contemplated" and not other subjective aspects of assumption of risk such
as appreciation of the risks and the voluntariness of its assumption. So to make
what the consumer contemplates alone a controlling aspect of defectiveness and
then make defectiveness a requirement of recovery is to deprive a plaintiff of much
of the protection that the courts over the years have built into assumption of risk.
135. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
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Further, by making what would be "contemplated by the
ultimate consumer" a characteristic of defectiveness, the burden
of proof on this feature is placed on the plaintiff by Comment g.
On the other hand, if matters bearing on the knowledge of the
ultimate consumer is treated where it characteristically belongs,
as a factor in assumption of risk, the test would be more comprehensive and substantially subjective, and the burden of proof
would be on the defendant. As the Comments now have it, a
plaintiff may not be able to overcome the objective hurdles
posed by Comments g and j, thus preventing his recovery,
whereas if the matters were left to assumption of risk, the defendant would be unable to discharge his burden of proof on
that issue and recovery would result. This is because, in addition to the burden of proof factor, assumption of risk involves
more than what the "ultimate consumer" contemplates as to
the physical characteristics of the product, and whether a warning has been given as to those dangerous features which he
does not contemplate. It involves actual knowledge of the risks,
full appreciation and understanding of them, and action voluntarily encountering them while that actual knowledge, appreciation and full understanding are present. Thus, the seller of
the product is placed in a more favorable position than he would
have been had all matters bearing on the knowledge of the
consumer been left for consideration under assumption of risk.
An approach which is harsher than that imposed by that warning and questionable doctrine is highly suspect.
Still another reason for treating these factors under assumption of risk is that it would enable them to become involved in
the reconciliation that must be made between the Restatement's
(Second) position of outlawing express disclaimers while recognizing implied assumptions of risk. 136 What the Restatement
Comments now seem to be saying is that if the consumer knows
of a risk from a specific, known defect, and encounters it, he
will be barred from recovery by impliedly assuming it, though
there may be no consideration or estoppel involved; on the other
hand, if he knows and understands that there may be injurious
defects not yet discovered, though he understands what their
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 402A, Comments m and n (1965).
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nature might be if they did exist, he cannot for a consideration
expressly disclaim his right to recover if such risk and injury
actually come to pass. The differences in basic underlying policy
in these two situations is a bit hard to delineate. But at any
rate, matters which bear on the consumer's knowledge and
understanding should be included under assumption of risk for
comprehensive consideration with the policy on disclaimers
rather than having such knowledge and understanding given
the foreign assignment of altering what are essentially physical
characteristics of products.
The false analogies appearing in Restatement (Second) Comment i, "Unreasonably dangerous," whereby sugar, butter,
whiskey, and cigarettes are equated, and all claimed not to be
"unreasonably dangerous" in their normal state, could be avoided
by placing cigarettes in Comment k, "Unavoidably unsafe products," which they unquestionably are for their normal, intended
use. There is no known way whereby tar and nicotine cigarettes
can be made safe for their only normal, intended and temperate
use. They are "unavoidably unsafe." If cigarettes were treated
under Comment k, their utility could be balanced against the
established harm from their use, as the Comment properly does
in the cases of rabies vaccine and new drugs. Since cigarettes
are neither food nor traditional medicine, since it is doubtful
that they cure any mental ills except those of their own creation,
and since their use kills more people annually than die from
automobile accidents, the Viet-Nam war and murder, it is hard
to see where on balance their manufacturers have any valid
claim to market them liability free.
Speaking in terms of the second announced function of this
paper, it is believed that the courts ,should conclude as a matter
of law, based on public policy, 137 that assumption of risk should
not be applied in personal injury actions brought against cigarette manufacturers by either child cigarette' smokers, or child
smokers who have become adult smokers. For the courts not to
so conclude would constitute regression in the field of product
liability which only now somewhat tardily is arriving where
justice long ago indicated should have been its destination.
137. Compare the language of the court in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,

164 S.W. 2d 828, 829 (Tex. 1942) : "We think the manufacturer is liable in such
a case under an implied warranty imposed by operation of law as a matter of
public policy."
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of 3 measures of relationship between cigarette smoking and overall
death rates by age and sex as derived from 2 major prospective studies.1
3544
U.S. VETERANS: MEN
Total deaths -----------------------8--383
Death rates per 100,000:
Never smoked regularly .................. 127
Current cigarette smokers .............. 232
M ortality ratio2 ...................................

1.83

45-54
366
264
728
2.76

Age
55-64
13,840
1,056
1,819
1.72

65-74
17,550

75-84
1,932

2,411
6,214
4,032
8,471
1.67
1.36

Difference in death rates per
100,0003 ............................................

105

464

762

1,621

2,257

Excess deaths as percentage of
tota 4 ..................................................

33

43

21

17

8

631

5,297

8,427

8,125

3,968

210

406

397
1.89

406
2. 28

1,202
1,202

3,168
7,863
9,674
4,788
1.51
1.23

HAMMOND MEN
Total Deaths ..............................
Death rates per 100,000:
Never smoked regularly ..................
Current cigarette smokers ..............
M ortality ratio2 ....................................

1.83
Difference in death rates per
100,0003 ..............................................
187
1,000
1,620
519
Excess deaths as percentage of
13
25
T ota4 ................................................
33
38

1,811
4

HAMMOND WOMEN
Total deaths ................................
Death rates per 100,000
Never smoked regularly ..................
Current cigarette smokers ..............
M ortality ratio2 ....................................
Difference in death rates per
100,0003 ..............................................

727
165
186
1.13

2,826
304
384
1. 26

3,915
698
838
1.20

5,115

4,188

5,914
1,913
5,846
2,229
1.17
.99

21
80
140
316
68
Excess deaths as percentage of
total4 ..................................................
5
9
4
2
.........
1 These figures are derived from the references. 5 year age groups were combined directly from the reported statistics without adjustment to any standard
population.
2 Mortality ratios Death rate for current cigarette smokers divided by death

rate for those who never smoked regularly.
s Difference in death rates-Death rate for current cigarette smokers minus
death rate for those who never smoked regularly.
4 Excess deaths among current cigarette smokers (i.e., additional deaths that
occurred among current cigarette smokers per year above those which would have
occurred if smokers had the same death rates as those who never smoked regularly). This is expressed as a percentage of all deaths occurring in that age-sex group.
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APPENDIX B
Population, By Age, Sex, and Color: 1.966

[In thousands. Estimates as of July 1. The median is the value which divides the
distribution into two equal parts- one-half of the cases falling below this value
and one-half exceeding this value.]
All Classes
Age
Total
Male
All ages ........................................
195,857
95,920
Under 5 years ......................................
19,851
10,135
5 to 9 years ..........................................
20,806
10,580
10 to 14 years ......................................
19,402
9,861
15 to 19 years ......................................
17,756
8,950
20 to 24 years .................... 13,606
6,625

Female
99,937
9,715
10,226
9,542
8,806
6,981

25
30
35
45
55

to
to
to
to
to

29
34
44
54
64

years ......................................
11,472
5,632
years......................................
10,852
5,326
years ......................................
24,097
11,738
years ......................................
22,298
10,822
years ......................................
17,260
8,247

5,840
5,527
12,359
11,476
9,013

65
70
75
80
85

to 69
to 74
to 79
to 84
years

years ......................................
6,378
2,901
years ......................................
5,190
2,261
years ......................................
3,688
1,564
years ......................................
2,076
847
and over ................................
1,124
430

3,476
2,929
2,124
1,230
694

Under 1 year ........................................
3,666
1,872
1 to 4 years ..........................................
16,185
8,263
5 to 13 years ........................................
36,525
18,567
14 to 17 years ......................................
14,289
7,258
18 to 21 years ......................................
12,549
6,191
14
18
21
65

years
years
years
years

and over ................................
138,481
67,217
and over ................................
125,192
59,960
and over ................................
115,347
55,080
and over ................................
18,457
8,004

Median age ....
years ..........................
27.8

26.6

1,793
7,922
17,958
7,032
6,358
72,264
65,232
60,268
10,453
29.0

Source: Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 352.

